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The Impact of Union Corruption on Union 
Membership 
 
CHRISTOPHER  K. COOMBS and RICHARD CEBULA* 
 
 
This paper examines the relationship between union corruption actions and union 
membership.  State-level data from the Office of Labor-Management  Standards, 
and  other  sources,  are utilized  over two  study periods  (1974-2000  and  2001- 
2008) to test three hypotheses, including the union corruption hypothesis, as pos- 
sible explanations for the decline in union membership in the United States over 
time. Although our initial findings suggest a negative relationship exists between 
union corruption and membership, after removing the possibility of simultaneous 
equations bias, we find that changes in corruption do not influence changes in 
union membership in our sample. 
 
 
If ever they write the obituary for tbe labor movement in this country, the cause of 
death will be listed as "suicide." Left to mourn will be the countless decent, 
hardworking rank-and-fi lers who were betrayed and bled by their ostensible 
leaders. 
Editorial, Daily News, Mar. 5, 1999 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
THE UNITED  STATES HAS  WITNESSED  A CONSISTENT  DECLINE  IN PRIVATE SECTOR UNION 
MEMBERSHIP, on average, since the mid-l 950s. Furthermore, the private sector 
unionization rate has fallen from an average of 22.6 percent in 1974 to 11.4 
percent in 2008. If it is to grow in the future, it is important to understand the 
historical factors limiting the influence of American trade unionism. 
Although  illegal union activities are well documented and have received  a 
good deal of publicity over time, the argument that it" can account for at least 
some of the decline in membership is relatively novel. There have been studies 
providing overviews of the prevalence of union corruption in the United States 
 
* The authors' affiliations are, respectively, Assistant Professor of Economics, Louisiana State University 
in Shreveport, Shreveport, Louisiana. E-mail: chris.coombs@lsus.edu; The Billy J. Walker/Wells Fargo 
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but to our knowledge, only one study exists that quantifies the dollar amount 
associated with this particular form  of fraudulent  activity. 1 To date, however, 
no empirical examination has focused on the potential negative impact of cor- 
n1ption on union membership. 
To the extent that unions are infiltrated with corruption, such as racketeer- 
ing, embezzlement, fraud, theft, and linkages to organized crime, the primary 
victims are the rank-and-file union members. At the very least, the cost 
incurred from this outcome is that the terms of their collective bargaining con- 
tracts are not completely satisfied. However, personal safety can aJso be jeop - 
ardized; alternatively, or in addition, pension funds may be in  jeopardy 
(become "emaciated"). To the extent that organized crime co-exists within a 
union in a leadership role, it is possible that union officials neither possess the 
administrative skills nor the interest in furthering the initiatives or addressing 
the grievances and concerns of the membership. As an example, one can sim- 
ply envision a corrupt union officer turning a blind eye to unsafe working con- 
ditions in exchange for bribes (Jacobs 2006). Moreover, according to Jacobs 
(2006: 101), "The members of racketeer-ridden  unions  suffer  on  account  of 
the wholesale violation of their rights of free speech, participation in union 
elections, and fair representation  in grievance proceedings." 
The basic purpose of this study is to identify the potential effect of union 
financial corruption on the behavior of union members. That is, we test the 
empirical validity of the "union corruption" hypothesis, which contends that 
corruption in union s serves as a signal to its members that their interests are not 
supported by the union , thereby decreasing the expected net benefits of union 
membership. The hypothesis argues that union corruption has reduced the 
demand for union membership and therefore contributed to the decline in union 
density within the U.S. labor force. As an extension of Freeman and Medoff 
(1984), who show that, at least in th e eyes of the rank-and-file, corruption 
among union leadership during the 1969-1978 period is not particularly wide- 
spread, we test the hypothesis using state-Jevel data during the 2001-2008 per- 
iod. As observed below, only relatively recent access to union con-uption data 
suggests that any quantitative assessment of its impact may risk being labeled as 
premature. Nonetheless, the evidence that we do find indicates declines in union 
membership in states with more cases of union corruption, everything else the 
same. However, when addressing the potential issue of simultaneity bia s, the 
parameter estimate for union corruption is no longer statistically significant. 
 
 
 
1  See  Hutchison   (1972),  Horowitz   (1999),  Chavez  and  Gray   (2004),  and   Jacobs  (2006),   for  example,  on 
the history of COJTUption in unions. See Thi eblot (2006) for an overv iew of the financial  concern  of  union 
COffUption. 
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The study is organized as follows: the next section reviews the literature on 
the major factors alleged to play  a role in the decline in private sector union 
membership in the United States over time. The analysis then provides the 
variables used in the analysis and the estimating equation. Using  cross-sec- 
tional time-series data, the subsequent section provides the empirical results 
for the "union corruption" hypothesis. The final section provides concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
 
Literature Review 
To date, four major hypotheses have been proposed to explain the steady 
decline in private sector union membership over the last several decades. The 
"structural" hypothesis (Farber 1985; Freeman 1985; Moore and  Newman 
1988; Neumann and Rissman 1984) argues that changes in the structure and 
composition of the labor force have caused the decline in union density. For 
example, proponents argue that over time decreases in  employment in rela- 
tively strongly unionized sectors, such as the goods producing sector, has con- 
tributed to the decline in union membership. Overwhelmingly, these studies 
find support for this hypothesis and when other hypotheses are tested, the 
structural variables are usually included as standard controls. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) and Freeman (1985) review a series of stud- 
ies that analyze the effect of managerial opposi tion to unionism on its mem- 
bership . There are three basic way s that management can oppose unionism. 
First, management can engage in "positive labor relations ," which equates to 
offering workers wages that compete with union wages. Second, n1anagement 
can conduct tough legal campaigns to convince workers that their interests 
will be better served by remaining nonunion. Third, management can engage 
in illegal activities to thwart union success. Within Freeman and Medoff 's 
(1984) review, Di ckens (1983) finds support for the "management opposi- 
tion " hypothesis whereas the earlier study by Getman, Goldberg, and 
Herman (1976) rejects the hypothesis that firm opposition has caused a 
decline in union  membership. Due to data limitations, most of these and 
other more recent studies focus primaril y on illegal campaigning , as mea- 
sured by unfair labor-practice complaints, to test the hypothesis. More con- 
temporary studies such as Freeman (1988), Reder (1988), and Farber (1990) 
provide evidence in support of the "management opposition" hypothesis. 
According to the "changes in public policy" or "government substitution " 
hypothesis , changes in public policy can influence the demand for and supply 
of union services by altering the benefits of unionization and/or the costs of 
organizing. Changes in public policy include passage of the Taft-Hartley Act 
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in 1947, specifically the provision dealing with right-to-work laws. In a very 
comprehensive study by Davis and Huston (1995), it is found that passage of a 
right-to-work law in a state decreases the probability of union membership in 
that state by 8.2 percentage poi nts. However, the earlier study by Warren and 
Strauss (1979) does not find evidence of a negative effect on union membership 
from this particular form of policy/statute. Moore (1998) provides a review of 
the more recent determinants and effects of right-to-work laws. Neumann and 
Rissman (1984), Moore and Newman (1988), and Moore, Newman , and Scott 
(1989) test the effect that government's provision of certain social welfare bene - 
fits has on union membership. Coombs (2008) provides an extensive review of 
the literature that collectively has suggested mixed results on whether this par- 
ticular form of policy substitutes for the private provision of those benefits by 
unions. Additionally,  Coombs (2008) reviews th e literature that empirically 
examines the argument that union membership is affected by the manner in 
which different states have interpreted the common-law doctrine of "employ- 
ment-at-will. " Among the findings, Neumann and Rissman (1984) suggest that 
a deterrent to a state's union growth is the implicit contract exception , wherein 
it is found that a bindin g contract has been established, such as through oral 
statements of employer policy, established past practices of the employer, or 
policies expressed in a personnel manual, requiring just cause for dismissal. 
The "union organizing" hypothesis contends that a decline in union  orga- 
nizing efforts contribut ed to the decline in union membership.  Voos  (1983, 
1984) finds that the amount of a union 's organizing activity, as measured  by 
its expenditures on organizing programs, has a direct association with organiz- 
ing success. Using the data in Voos (1983, 1984) on union organizing expendi- 
tures per nonunion · worker in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) estimate that possibly as much as a  third  of  the  decline  in 
union success through NLRB election over this period is linked to  reduced 
labor organizing activity. 
With respect to the "union corruption" hypothesis, Freeman and Medoff 
(1984) provide a table of total convictions, from 1969 to 1978, for criminal 
activity in labor unions, suggesting that the nature and incidence of union  cor- 
ruption is small, i.e., the vast majority of union officials carry out their duties 
in a law-abiding, responsibl e manner. However, according to Thieblot (2006 : 
513), "...corruption proceeds at a pace that cannot be considered abeITant 
behavior or limited in scope and breadth." Concluding that corruption in 
American labor unions is a "widespread plague that may affect their future 
viability," Thieblot (2006: 531) finds that between the middle of 1998 and the 
end of 2005, there were 1,238 documented instances of corruption in Ameri - 
can labor unions, distributed among 137 different organization s. Furthennore, 
although the listing includes some of the smallest  union s, most national  level 
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unions appeared in the listing. Additionally, according to the Office of Inspec- 
tor General in reporting its Semiannual Report to Congress for the period end- 
ing September 30, 2008, labor racketeering continues to have  a  negative 
impact on American workers, employers , and the public through  reduced 
wages and benefits, diminished competitive business opportunities,  and 
increased costs for goods and services. To the extent that the scope of union 
corruption is more pervasive than first perceived and/or to the  extent  that  it 
has increased in magnitude, an interesting question is whether this conduct is a 
possible explanation of the decline in unionism (the percentage of the  labor 
force belonging to unions) in the United States over the last few decades. In 
other words, the basic issue of concern is whether diminished unionization is a 
reflection of workers' preferences for unions that are not marred by corruption. 
 
 
 
Estimating Equations and Variables 
The present study uses a supply and demand reduced-form model of union 
services to explain the variation in the extent  of  union  membership  among 
states over two period s: 1974-2000, and 2001-2008. Ashenfelter and Pencavel 
(1969) is the seminal piece of literature that systematically analyzes the deter- 
minants of union me1nbership within the context of a demand and supply 
framework. Historically, it has been difficult to obtain data on the relative price 
of union membership, which l eads to estimation of reduced-form equations for 
unionism rather than structural equations describing the demand for and supply 
of union services. Of course, when the  supply of and demand for union ser- 
vices are equal, the equilibrimn level of unionization in the system exists. The 
various hypotheses presented in the literature pose factors that cause either the 
demand curve or supply curve of union services to shift, which  results in  a 
new equilibrium level of unionization. We employ the supply and demand 
reduced-form model of union services over the longer period for preliminary 
tests of some of the alternative hypotheses described above. We describe these 
hypotheses and the use of the longer study period in greater detail below. The 
shorter period is utilized to control for the other hypotheses but to specifically 
test the union corruption hypothesis. We are limited to this sample period 
because data  on civil and  cri1ninal investigations of alleged violations of the 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) and 
related  laws,  provided  by  the  U.S. Department  of Labor's  Office  of  Labor- 
Management Standards (OLMS), is made available starting in 2001. These 
investigations provide the inf01mation for our measure of union corruption.2 
 
2  Source: http://www.dol.gov/olms/. 
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In pursuit of its objecti ves, there are as many as nine ind ependent/explana- 
tory variables testing up to three hypotheses to explain the decline in union 
density; these specific variables, and the dependent  variable, are discussed 
below. 
 
 
 
Dependent  Variable 
Union Density. Using Hirsch and Macpherson (2003), and data from the 
authors' websites, we define union density as the percentage of a state's civil- 
ian empJoyment  population  that are union members.3  This dependent variable 
is adopted to investigate the impact of union financial corruption on union 
membership. 
 
 
 
Independent  Variables 
Union Corruption Hypothesis Variable. Examples of kickbacks and extor- 
tion, as Freeman and Medoff (1984) show, are the most prevalent forms of 
criminal action associated with violence within unions. However, according to 
Thieblot (2006), financial con-uption-embezzlement, pension malfeasance, 
misuse of funds, and so forth-is the simplest and most frequent form of cor- 
ruption detected . Moreover, as Freeman and Medoff (1984: 211-12) observe, 
"Embezzling resources from a union treasury or a union-management health, 
welfare, or pension fund ... receives the greatest publicity ... and are generally 
nonviolent activities ." This sort of corruption, as Thieblot (2006: 515) states, 
"has been practiced in unions  ... by persons at almost any level physically 
able to touch their organization 's income stream, especially if they have some 
measure of check-writing authori ty," and clearly has the direct effect of 
decreasing the net benefits of union membership (although in many cases, 
when this form of corruption is uncovered, some degree of restitution is 
made). However, the negative publicity received from this internal mistreat- 
rnent could nevertheless lead to a decrease in the perceived net benefits of 
union membership at the margin, especially for those members who suspect 
that there is a lack of obligation to represent their best interests. 
Corruption incidents: Office of Labor-Management Standards staff conduct 
investigations to determine whether violations of the LMRDA provisions have 
occurred. Investigations are initiated based on various sources such as com- 
plaints  from union  members,  infonnation  developed  by  OLMS  as  a result  of 
 
3 Source: http://www.union stats.com . 
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reviewing reports filed, and information developed during an OLMS audit of a 
union's books and records. Investigati ons may involve civil 1natters (such as 
an election of union officers) or criminal matters (such as embezzlement of 
union fu nds). Since 2001, both civil and criminal enforcement actions of the 
OLMS 's actions have been general disclosure. As presented by Thieblot 
(2006), counting criminal actions is always difficult and somewhat subjective. 
Using the OLMS's list, we had to carefully check to ensure not to multiple 
count. That is, over the course of an investigation,  the OLMS can list the 
indictment , information , charge, guilty plea, conviction, and sentence of a 
defendant. In these cases, we made a point to include each incident only once 
through cross-referencing by the name(s) of the defendant(s). This was not an 
issue for civil cases given the nature of these matters and the relatively low 
rate of occurrence over time. For our analysis, we count the number of civil 
and crimi nal actions for each state over the period 2001-2008 as a measure of 
union corruption. Each case lists the state's district comi providing us with the 
incident in that state. 
 
Structural Hypothesis Variables.  (a)  The percentag e  of  nonwhites  in  the 
state s labor force: In theory, there is both a demand and supply effect with 
respect to the relationship between nonwhites in the labor force and union 
membership. Nonwhi tes may have a high er de1nand for union services because 
of their perceived need for protection against discrimination .  On  the  other 
hand, union leaders' taste for discrimination increases the costs of organizing 
nonwhites , lowering the supply of union services to them. Most of the existing 
empirical hterature indicates that the demand effect dominates and that th ere is 
a positive relationship  between nonwhites  in the labor force and union mem- 
bership.4 In a relatively more recent study, however, over the period  1950- 
1980, Moore and Newman (1988) find no evidence of a relationship between 
nonwhites in the labor force and union  density. Because the two forces work 
in different directions with respect to the equilibrium  level  of union  density, 
we do not hypothesize a net relationship, ex ante. 
(b) The percentage of females in the state s labor force: Because women on 
the average tend to move in and out of the labor force relatively more fre- 
quently than men, they are likely to have a lower demand for union services. 
Moore and Newman (1975, 1988) and Hirsch (1980) find evidence for this 
hypothesis. Farber (1985), however, argues that when other occupational  fac- 
tors are accounted for, there is no difference in the demand for union services 
betw een women and men. Further, over time, women's attitudes toward unions 
may  change. For  example, to the  extent that there  are relatively  more  single 
 
4  See Moore and Newman (1975), Lumsden  and Petersen (1975), Hirsch  (1980), and  Farber (1985). 
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women (perhaps with children) in the labor force today, they might have a 
demand for union services, particularly services that include health care. Addi- 
tionally, increased stability of einployment for women and reduced discrimina- 
tion against women over time could positively affect their demand for union 
membership . Although we do not include occupational factors in this analysis, 
we do not posit a relationship under the presumption that the taste factor and 
mobility factor work in opposition to one another with respect to the equilib- 
rium level of union membership. 
(c) The percentage of 16-24 year olds in the state's labor force: There is 
some evidence to suggest that union wage premiums are higher for relatively 
younger members and this might imply a higher demand for union  services. It 
is important to consider, however, that over a relatively long time period, this 
age variab le · also has a taste or cohort characteristic embodied. That  is, the 
group of workers who are 16-24 years old in 2008 is not the same group of 
workers that were 16-24 years old in 1974; in fact, the 2008 group were not 
even born . Tastes and attitudes toward unions could be  quite  different  from 
those of workers age l 6-24 today compared to workers age 16-24 over thirty 
years ago. The expected influence of the young labor force variable on union 
density is therefore unclear. However, over a shorter period (2001-2008), we 
can expect less, if at all, of a cohort effect. 
(d) The percentage  of 55-64 year olds in the state's labor force:  Freeman 
( 1981) presents evidence indicating that fringe benefits , especially with respect 
to pension plans , are superior in the union sector. This would  arguably 
increase relatively older workers' demand for  union  membership.  Again, 
though , with this group we can expect to also have a cohort or taste character- 
istic embodied when analyzing over a longer time period; the direction of the 
effect is  unclear. Over a shorter period, however, the taste or cohort factor 
becomes less influential. Perhaps most importantly, to the extent that the union 
sector also establishes better-quality health care insurance, we would expect 
workers in this age group to have a higher demand for union services. 
(e) The percentage of the state population living in urban · areas:  To  the 
extent that organizing costs are  relatively lower in  urban areas,  the  supply  of 
union services to these areas  is  arguably  greater  than  rural  areas.  Also,  Moore 
and Newman (1988) argue that urban environments are more conducive to col- 
lectivists'  attitudes.  For  these  reason s,  we  expect  a  positive  relationship 
between  urban  population  and union  density. 
(f) The percentage of the state's labor force in the goods producing sector : 
Historically, union membership in the United States has been concentTated in a 
relatively small number of industries, usually associated with heavy-goods pro- 
duction. Within the mining, constiuction , manufacturing , and transportation 
industi·ies,  it  is  possible  that  organizing  costs  are  relatively  low.  It is  also 
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plausible that the work environment (i.e., working conditions) in these indus- 
tries lead to a higher demand for union services. Following the existing litera- 
ture, we expect a positive relationship between the extent of unionization and 
this variable. 
 
Management Opposition Hypothesis  Variable.    The number of CA cases in 
a state as a percentage of eligible voters: As reported in the National Labor 
Relations Board Annual Reports, for each state,  we include the  number  of 
unfair practices charged against management in all CA cases in NLRB certifi- 
cation elections , scaled by the number of employees eligible to vote. CA cases 
refer to charges that employers violated section 8(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Although the empirical literature has provided mixed evidence, in theory man- 
agement opposition negatively affects both the demand for and  supply  of 
union services. Moore and Newman (1988) find no statistical effect of man- 
agement opposition on union density over the 1950-1980 period. Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) however, through their own analysis and a review of the litera- 
ture, argue that management opposition is one of the biggest influences on the 
decline in unionization in the United States. We expect a negati ve relationship 
between our management opposition proxy and the extent of union density. 
 
Economic Control Variables . (a) The state s consum er price index: We treat 
the rate of inflation as exercising an effect of variation in the economic environ- 
ment on union membership. 5 Although we might expect that the law of d emand 
would hold with regards to union membership , the consmner price index 
includes the prices of many (in excess of 90,000 categories) goods and services. 
Therefore, one might argue that the rationale for the substitution effect (where 
more [less] of a specific product is purchased because it becomes relatively 
cheaper [more expensive]) is not as a practical matter applicable. On the other 
hartd , to the extent that unionization results in relatively higher nominal wages, 
an increase in the prices that households pay for goods and services could lead 
individuals to desire union membership in order to mitigate the effects thereof 
on their real wages. On these theoretical grounds , we therefore expect the impact 
of the consumer price index on union membership to be positive. 
(b) The state :S unemploym.ent rate: An additional factor adopted to asce1iain 
whether union  membership  is affected  by  economic  conditions  in the economy 
is the state's unemployment rate.6 This variable has been routinely included  in 
union  growth  models  and  generally  accounts for worker  discontent  associated 
 
 
5 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; h ttp ://www.bls.gov/cpi/ . 
6 Source : U.S. Censu s Bureau , Statistica l Abstract of the United States. Labor Force, Employment , and 
Earn ings; Unemployment Rates by State and Sex. 
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TABLE 1 
 
MODEL  DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS: VARI A BLE  MEANS 
 
Variabl e 1974-2000 2001-2008 Iti -stat i stic 
 
Union density (%) 1 6.646  (7.345) J  l.55 1 (5.616) 12.765 (0.000) 
Percentage of nonwh ites in labor force 9.043 (8.681) 9. 160 (9.ll2) 0.233 (0.816) 
Percenta ge of females in labor force 44.160 (2.558) 46.323 ( 1.819) 15.723 (0.000) 
Percenta ge of labor force aged  J 6-24 19.397 (3.057) 15.774 (1.814) 22.5 12 (0.000) 
Percenta ge of labor force aged 55-64 J  0.379  (1.741) 12.553 ( 1.580) 22.3 (0.000) 
Percentage of popula tion living in urban areas 68.438 (14.427) 7J .654  (14.788) 3.875 (0.000) 
Percentage of labor force in goods producing  sector 26.428 (9.013) 15.365 (3.139) 24.099 (0.000) 
Number of CA cases per eligible voter (%) I 0.3 16 (9.926) 17.925 (29.608) 7.933 (0.000) 
Consum er price index 1.148 (0.438) l.9 1 1 (0.21 5) 33.609 (0.000) 
Unempl oyment rate (%) 6.133 (2.107) 4.955 ( 1.108) I 0.728  (0.000) 
Corrupti on incidents  3.065 (4.00 1)  
N 1300 400  
NoTE: Stand ard  deviations  in  parenth eses.  Excludes District  of Columbi a. Column  4  reports the I-statistic (p va lues  in 
parenthe ses) from a t test that the differences in means equal zero between the the two sample periods. 
 
wth uncertainty regarding job loss during phases of the business cyc]e when 
cyclical unemployment is increasing. Therefore, within a simple reduced -form 
model of the demand for and supply of union services, we expect that a higher 
unemployment rate will lead to an increase in the demand for union represen- 
tation to reduce the risk of unemployment  in the future. Although some of the 
previous literature has controlled specifically for cyclical unemployment , we 
follow the general convention and inciude all types of unemployment. 7 
In testing the union corruption hypothesis, in addition to  other hypotheses, 
within a simple reduced -form model, the objective is to measure the relative 
contribution of the variables to cross-sectional variations in the degree of 
unionization among the states over the period 2001-2008. Because of data 
limitations with respect to our key independent variable, however, support for 
or against the additional hypotheses could be misleading over the shorter per- 
iod to the extent that these factors were influential prior to 2001 but  have 
become less important by the beginning of the twenty -first century. In other 
words, although we cannot systematically test for the union corruption hypoth - 
esis prior to 2001, we can test for earlier evidence of the structural and man- 
agement hypothesis , and we do this over the period  1974-2000. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the 
model. Also provided are t values from t tests that the differences in means 
equal zero between the two sample periods. With respect to the variabl es used 
 
 
7  Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) included  the amount of unemployment in the preced ing trough of the 
. business cycle as an explanatory variable for the annual percentage change i.n trade union membership. Bain 
and El sh eikh (1976) separated unemployment changes into positive and n egative compon ents to allow for 
asymm etric  effects. 
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to test the various hypotheses , this provides an illustration of the trend that has 
taken place in the United States from 1974-2008, on average. 
In order to estimate a model relating the behavior of union members  to 
financial corruption , we initially propose the method of pooled ordinary least 
squares (Wooldridge 2002). The basic model can be  written,  for  a  randomly 
drawn  cross-section  observation  i, as 
           t = 1, 2, . . . , T ( 1) 
where Yit is union density in state i in year t; Xit is 1 x K and can contain 
observable variables that change across t but not i , variables that change across 
i but not t, and variables that change across i and t; µi is an unobserved , time- 
constant variable specific to the individual cross-sectional unit i ; and Ei, is an 
idiosyncratic error term. In our analysis, we could consider that µ contains 
unobserved state characteristics that may have an effect on  the  process  of 
union membership and can be viewed as being constant over the time period 
in question. In this case, we would treat µi as a parameter to be estimated for 
each i by including a dummy variable for each state. The dummy variable 
regression method gives the same estimates of the parameters as fixed effects 
estimation. However, one of the assumptions of the fixed effects estimator, and 
therefore the dummy variable estimator, is that the idiosyncratic errors Eit have 
a constant variance across t and are serially uncorrelated. In addition, it is 
assumed that the disturbances have different variances for each cross-section 
and are constant within each i. If within-unit observations are not independent 
of one another, this assumption is violated. Using the robust clustered variance 
estimator will provide efficient parameter estimates and correct standard errors 
for hypothesis tests. 
 
 
 
Empirical Results 
Table  2 includes the results for two moqels that will provide our analysis of 
·the structural, manage1nent opposition, and union corruption hypothesis. For 
each regression, the dependent variable is union membership as a percentage 
of employees in nonagricultural establishments. The earlier sample period 
includes state-level data from 1974-2000; the more recent period incl udes state-
level data from 2001-2008 . In both samples, the  District  of  Columbia was 
excluded from the regression, which leads to a sample size of N = 1700 and 
N = 400 for the l onger and shorter periods, respectively. 8 Preliminaiy tests 
 
8 l t was concluded , through regression diagnostics, that data for several of th e variabl es for the District 
of Columbi a presented nwnerous outliers. Output from the regression diagnostics is available upon request. 
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TABLE 2 
 
REG RESSION  RESULTS OF THE UN ION  CORRUPT ION HYPOTJ-J ESI S 
 
Variable 1974-2000 200 1-2008 
Percentage of nonwhites  in labor force 
Percentage of females in labor force 
Percentage  of labor force aged  J 6-24 
Percentage of  labor force aged  55-64 
Percentage of population  living in urban areas 
Percentage of .labor force in good s produ ci ng sector 
Number of CA cases per eligible voter 
Consumer  price index 
Un employment  rate 
Con-u ption incidents 
Constant 
N 
Within R2 
0.094 (0.058) 
-0.355 (0.125)*** 
-0.202 (0.078)** 
0.206 (0.108)* 
-0.07 1 (0.078) 
0.123 (0.077) 
0.005 (0.005) 
-0 .141 (0.474) 
0 .205 (0.07 1)*** 
 
46.691 (9.566)*** 
1300 
0.77 
0. I 1 5 (0.096) 
-0.021 (0.070) 
-0.068 (0.080) 
0.1 82 (O.J 19) 
0.272  (O.O J  l)*** 
0.061   (0.069) 
-0.002 (0.002) 
0.10I (0.298) 
-0.048 (0.J 50) 
-0.072 (0.016)*** 
-2.186 (3.222) 
400 
0.17 
 
NoTE:   Robust standard  errors  in  parenth eses; ***,  **, and  *indicate significance at  0.0 1, 0.05,  and  0.10  level, respectively. 
A ll  regressions include state and yea r dummy  variables. 
 
 
 
for AR(l ) serial correlation include coefficients and standard errors of .6238 
(0.0197) and .2858 (0.0599) for the longer and shorter sample periods , respec- 
tivel y. Additionally,  tests  for  heteroskedasticity  include  F  statistics  of  6.31 
(p = 0.0000) and 1.97 (p = 0.0001) for the longer and shorter sample periods, 
respecti vely. Both models , therefore, include robust standard errors using the 
robust clustered variance estimator. 
A number of interesting patterns emerge comparing across the two models. 
First, the negative influence of the percentage of females in the labor force tends 
to decrease over the sample period. Moore and Newman (1988) find that over 
their sample period (1950-1980) the opposite actually occurred.  They  explain 
that over this period, female labor force participation was growing but in occu- 
pations that are traditionally more difficult to organize. Cebula and Coombs 
(2008) analyze factors accounting for the recent decline in female labor force 
participation. Among the findings are negative effects from increases in house- 
hold income and increases in the proportion of the population that is nonnative 
to the United States. To the extent that the decline in female labor force partici - 
pation is largely from those occupations in less unionized sectors, this  could 
very well explain the diminishing effect. Hence, the difference in parameter esti- 
mates across the two sample period s may reflect compositional changes more 
than changes in attitudes or preferences toward unions. 
Second, compared to Moore and Newman (1988), we find the same respective 
signs on our parameter estimates for relatively younger and older workers. Addi- 
tionally, for our sample period, the negative effect of a young labor force and 
the positive effect of a senior labor force tend to decrease. The negative coeffi- 
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cient on the younger labor force variable was not necessarily anticipated unless 
it is measuring a cohort or taste effect. It could be, however, that relatively youn- 
ger workers are more independent and less in favor of collectivist ideas. 
Overall, we get the same signs for our structural variables that are found in 
most of the earlier literature. Although not statistically significant by conven- 
tional standards, the coefficient on the percentage of nonwhites in the labor 
force is positive in both sample periods. Over the period  1950-1980, Moore 
and Newman (1988) also find a positive coefficient . Additionally, the magn i- 
tude (0.119) is close to what we attain in this analysis. 
One somewhat surprising result is that the coefficient on goods producing 
labor force is not statistically significant. Although in this case the anticipated 
sign is obtained and the coefficient is close to being statistically significant by 
conventional standards, its statistical insignificance is not altogether surprising 
since Moore and Newman (1988) also did  not  attain  statistical  significance 
over their sample period. 
We find no support for the management opposition hypothesis. Moore and 
Newman (1988) also do not find statistical support but Freeman and Medoff 's 
(1984) survey provides sufficient examples for the hypothesis that management 
engages in tactics that have a negative influence on unions in the workplace. 
Because management does not have to illegally campaign to have a negative 
influence on union membership, it is of course possible that we may have not 
adequately proxied for the management opposition hypothesis. 
Our measure for union corruption does indicate that union membership is 
negatively affected by incidents such as embezzlement, theft, and union officer 
elections. The coefficient on corruption incidents implies that for each case of 
corruption, union density decreases  by 0.07 percent, on average, holding all 
other variables constant. If there are 30 cases in a year, such as what we tabu- 
lated for New York in 2003, there would be a negative effect of 2.1 percent 
on union density, everything else constant. In 2008, we counted 25 total cases 
of union corruption in Pennsylvania. This would have a negative effect of 1.8 
percent on union membership, ceteris paribus. 
To the extent that these findings are convincing, they are even more striking 
if the union corruption hypothesis follows a similar trend to that of the struc- 
tural hypothesis and has become less important over time. Unlike proxying for 
the management opposition hypothesis, there is no legal corruption and data 
provided by OLMS is accurate and provides a clear measure of corruption in 
unions. If there is any weakness, however, it is certainly plausible that some 
corruption within unions has not been reported or discovered from financial 
reports. In this case, our results would be biased downwards. 
Another issue that would question the results of the union conuption 
hypothesis is the possibility of a simultaneity bias . Investigations of corruption 
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are initiated based on various sources such as complaints from union members, 
information developed by OLMS as a result of reviewing reports filed, 
and information developed during an OLMS audit of a union 's books and 
records . With respect to reports of corruption by members, this could be influ- 
enced by the relative strength of the union . That is, are members more or less 
likely to report corruption when the union is popular? Is corruption more or 
less appealing when the membership is strong? With respect to audits, we have 
no information about the protocol used that determi nes when an audit would 
take place. Therefore , we cannot rule out the possibility that the strength of 
the union (defined perhaps by membership) has some type of relationship with 
the probability of audit and, in tum, audits influence findings of corruption. It 
is possible that the bias is positive or negative, or if more than one bias exists, 
both. Regardless of the process of definition, if stronger unionization leads to 
more corruption, our initial results would be biased upward because part of the 
negative effect of union corruption on union densi ty would be offset by the 
positive effect runnin g in the opposite direction. In contrast, if there is a nega- 
tive relationship between union density and corruption , our results would be 
biased downward. 
Correction of this problem requires the estimation of a  simultaneous equa- 
tions model with instn1mental variables in the  transfonned  equation.
9  
Of 
course, one of the  challenges  of this  approach  is that it is often difficult  to 
obtain a valid instrument.  For this analysis, we need a variable that is corre- 
lated with the endogenous variable (union corruption) and is uncorrelated with 
the errors in the reduced-form model of union density. 
To facilitate the instrumental variable method, we use arrests in state i  in 
year t as an instrument for union corruption in state i in year t.
10 
To increase 
the likelihood of a correlation with the types of corruption within unions, we 
limit arrests to forgery, counterfeiting, embezzlement, fraud, and stolen prop- 
erty. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between corruption incidents 
and arrests is 0.61 (p = 0.000). When considering the potential  for correlation 
between our instrument and the error term in the reduced -form model of union 
density, we should consider other factors of union membership that have not 
been included. For example, the union organizing hypothesis argues that a 
decrease in organizing efforts contributed to the decline in union membership. 
To the extent that the union organizing hypothesis is valid, if we can make an 
argument that a correlation  exists between  organizing  efforts and arrests, our 
 
 
9 
We ran an auxiliary  regression with corruption incidents as the dependent variable and a lag of u nion 
density  as an  independ ent  vari able.  The  results provided  a  coefficient  on  lagged  un ion  density  equal  to 
0.226 and  a standard  error of 0. I 04  indicating union  conuption  should  be treated  as an endogenous  variable . 
10 
Source: http://www.fbi.gov /ucr/ucr.htm#ciu s. 
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TABLE 3 
SIMULTAN EOUS EQUATION ESTIMATES OF THE UN ION CORRUPTION HYPOTHESIS,  200 1-2008 
Variable 2001-2008 
Percentage of nonwhi tes in labor force 0.135 (0.101) 
Percentage of females in labor force -0.024 (0.073) 
Percentage of labor force aged 1 6-24 -0.043 (0.080) 
Percentage of labor force aged 55-64 0.191 (0.117) 
Percentage of population living in urban areas 0.275  (0.012)*** 
Percentage of labor force in goods p(oducing sector 0.065 (0.072) 
Number of CA cases per eligible voter -0.002 (0.002) 
Consumer price  index 0.078 (0.291) 
Unemployment rate -0.057 (0.  54) 
Corruption incidents -0.084 (0.089) 
Constant -2.583 (3.236) 
N 400 
NOTE: Robu st standard errors in parenth eses; *** indicates significance at 0.01 level. Regression includes state and year 
dummy variables. 
 
 
 
instrument would  be invalid. Fmiher, the government substitution hypothesis 
contends that government's provision of union-like services has provided a less 
expensive substitute for the  services that unions provide. Once again, if the 
government substitution hypothesis does explain some of the decline in union 
density in the United States over time, if there is a correlation between these 
provisions and arrests, our instrument would be considered invalid. With 
respect to the examples provided and other factors not considered, we assume 
there does not exist a correlation between arrests in state i and the error term 
in the reduced-form model of union density. 
The results of estimating the union corruption hypothesis using the instrmnen- 
tal variable method are reported in Table 3. We present only the results of the 
reduced-form model of union density since estimation of the equation explain- 
ing union corruption is not of consequential interest to the present discussion .
11
 
Almost identical to the results of the union corruption hypothesis model in 
Table 2, most of the coefficients are not statistically significant compared to the 
earlier sample period. Also, compared  to Table  2 all  coefficients  exhibit the 
same sign and are similar in magnitude. The only statistically significant coeffi- 
cien t is for the percentage of the population living in urban  areas  variable. ·
12 
Most  importantly,  however,  is  that  the  coefficient  on  union  corruption  is now 
 
11 The estimate from the first stage equation can be obtained from the authors upon request. We assume 
that union conupt ion is rel ated to the following variables: arrests, the number of CA cases per eligible voter, 
and representational disbursements by union s. 
12 
The statistically significant coefficient on urbanization rate impl ies that the rank cond ition for identify- 
ing the first equation is satisfied. In cidentally, th e coefficient on arrests in the first equation is positive and 
statisti cally significant, ind icating that the second equation in the system is identified. 
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slightly larger but no longer statistically significant. Thus, with the removal of 
simultaneity bias, there appears to be no support for the union corruption 
hypothesis, at least with respect to corruption over the years 2001-2008. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
We have considered empirically the "union corruption" hypothesis. To  the 
extent that corruption in American labor unions is as widespread as some sug- 
gest and the viability of its survival is questioned based on this argument, we 
would expect union membership to be  negatively  affected  by  this  behavior. 
This study has  employed a fixed effects model with cross-sectional time-series 
data in an attempt to determine whether union corruption negatively influences 
incumbent and potential union members' attitudes toward union membersh ip. 
Evidence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation warranted the  use  of  a 
robust clustered variance estimator.  Further,  in the  empirical  work,  we  allow 
for the possibility that the direction of causality between union corruption and 
membership  runs  in both  directions. 
Overall, we find the panel data evidence of  a negative corruption  effect on 
union density to be mixed. Measured as both  criminal  and  civil  actions,  our 
initial findings are that union corruption in a state negatively affects union den- 
sity in the state over the 2001-2008 period . However, to the extent that union 
corruption should be treated endogenously,  removal  of simultaneity bias results 
in a larger (negative) coefficient for the union corruption variable but it fails to 
obtain  statistical significance . 
The latter results, similar to what Freeman and Medoff (1984) suspected a 
number of years ago, suggest several possibilities. One is that union members 
are satisfied when restitution is made. To the extent that the net benefits of 
union membership are not affected as a result of the state district court's sen- 
tencing phase that includes restitution, we would not expect union membership 
in the state to be negatively impacted. In some cases, at the time of sentenc- 
ing, all or part of restitution had been made by the defendant(s). Or, as Free- 
man and Medoff (1984) argue, perhaps union corruption may be limited in 
scale; or, it may not generate sufficient awareness due to lack of exposure. By 
contrast, to the extent that the Department of Labor's OLMS staff has 
increased investigations as a result of putting union financial reports under a 
microscope, workers may feel secure that this illegal activity will not continue. 
This suggests that members expect their interests are supported, in this case, 
with the Department of Labor's complementary association . In conclusion, we 
are inclined to argue that the mixed results found in this analysis suggest more 
work is needed as more reports are filed by unions and more or less corruption 
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is uncovered. The implication that changes in union membership possibly 
impact corruption activity, findings of corruption, and/or reports of corruption 
suggests that union corruption should also be treated endogeneously. 
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